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NOTES
THE AMERICAN TRADE ENFORCEMENT
EFFECTIVENESS ACT: A WEAPON OF STEEL
Audria Kay Crain*
In the current U.S. political environment free trade
has become a polarized topic. Much of the American
public is concerned over job loss perceived to be caused
by free-trade. As a result, pressures have risen,
especially from the U.S. steel industry, to protect U.S.
industries from dumped goods. Trade remedy laws,
such as antidumping measures, are popular policies
utilized as countermeasures against "unfair trade"
practices. With bipartisansupport, the American Trade
Enforcement Effectiveness Act (ATEEA) was passed
and signed into law by President Obama on June 29,
2015 amending the Tariff Act of 1930. Specifically,
with regard to antidumping, it altered the standard
used by the U.S. International Trade Commission
(Commission) to find that a domestic industry has been
materially injured by a dumped product.
Most
importantly, the ATEEA disallows the Commission
from finding a domestic industry has been materially
injured merely because the industry has been recently
profitable. Two questions raised by the passage of the
ATEEA are analyzed: (1) have the changes affected the
Commission's final decisions in antidumpingpetitions,
particularly those involving the steel industry, and (2)
is it likely that the World Trade Organizationwill find
the changes to violate the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs
J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Georgia School of Law; M.A. International Studies
2010, University of Denver Joseph Korbel School of International Studies; B.A. Political
Science 2008, Columbus State University. I am grateful to my Note Editor Bethany
Edmondson for her revisions; the Georgia Law Review Editorial Board for their edits; and
my family for their support.
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and
Trade (GATT)
or the
Agreement
on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (Antidumping Agreement)? The
answer to the first question is clearly yes. The
Commission has issued a significantly higher number
of material injury findings in dumping investigations
than it did before the enactment. This is especially true
of complaints brought by the U.S. Steel industry,
indicatingthat the ATEEA has been frequently used as
a weapon of the U.S. steel industry against dumped
steel. Despite the significant effect of this change on the
Commission's decisions, however, it is unlikely that
these changes violate the GATT or the Antidumping
Agreement.
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I. INTRODUCTION

There is rising anxiety about free trade in America. The failure
to secure the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
free-trade agreement negotiated between the United States and
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, is some evidence of this
anxiety.1 The rhetoric of the 2016 presidential candidates is
further evidence. At their second presidential debate, both Hillary
Clinton and President Donald Trump condemned the oftcastigated trade practice of "dumping."2 Dumping is the selling of
products at lower-than-fair-value prices by foreign firms in
another country. 3 President Trump accused China of "dumping
vast amounts of steel all over the U.S., which essentially is killing
our steelworkers and steel companies." 4 Mrs. Clinton agreed,
stating, "China is illegally dumping steel in the U.S." and "putting
5
steelworkers and American steel plants out of business."
Employment in the American steel industry is projected to
decline over the next decade. 6 However, the degree to which this
decline is due to dumping, or free trade more broadly, is
uncertain. 7 Despite this uncertainty, Congress passed the Trade

1 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President, Trans-Pacific
Partnership(TPP) (Jan. 26, 2017, 6:25 PM), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agre
ements/trans-pacific-partnership[https://web.archive.rgweb/20170126062525/https://ustr.g
v/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreement/trans-pacific-partnership] (discussing the benefits
of the TPP agreement).
2 John W. Miller, Donald Trump's Use of Foreign Steel Undercuts a Major Campaign
Theme, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2016, 2:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumpsuse-of-foreign-steel-undercuts-a-major-campaign-theme- 1476470493.
3 See id. ("Dumping refers to selling [products] below cost plus margin to gain market
share.').
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Employment by Industry, Occupation, and Percent Distribution,2014 and Projected
2024, BUREAu OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/emp/ind-occ-matrix/ind xlsx/ind_331100.
xlsx (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (projecting a 3.7% decline in iron and steel mill manufacturing
from 2014 to 2024).
7 See Joseph S. Pete, U.S. Steel Industry Has Lost 48,000 Jobs Since 2000, N.W. IND. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nwitimes.com/business/steel/u-s-steel-industry-has-lost-jobs-since/
article_4ffd704a-lcdc-5eb9-82eb-0b858a369877.html
(discussing the overall decline in
employment experienced by the American steel industry since 1970 and the "import" crisis it
faced in the early 2000s). But see Sabri Ben-Achour, Steel's Decline Was About Technology,
Not Trade, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 9, 2016, 4:50 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/08/09/wo
rldIsteels-decline-was-about-technology-not-trade-0 (comparing the decrease in employment
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Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (Trade Remedies Bill).8 The
Trade Remedies Bill was signed by President Obama on June 29,
2015.9 A major component of this bill was the American Trade
Enforcement and Effectiveness Act (ATEEA).10 Congress enacted
the ATEEA to address a specific aspect of the American public's
concern over free-trade-job loss.1 1 The ATEEA addresses this
concern by making the path to relief from dumping easier for
12
domestic industries.
Section II provides an overview of dumping, antidumping, and
antidumping law in the U.S.
Section III analyzes U.S.
antidumping law before-the ATEEA's amendment; the decisions of
the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission) in
petitions against foreign producers; and two cases decided shortly
before the ATEEA's enactment. These two cases elucidate the
concerns of domestic producers under the law's prior structure.
Section IV analyzes the changes made to U.S. antidumping law by
the ATEEA. It answers two questions raised by these changes: (1)
has the ATEEA affected the Commission's final decisions in
antidumping petitions, specifically those involving the steel
industry; and (2) will the changes made by the ATEEA violate the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement)?
Regarding the first question, the changes to the ATEEA have
affected the Commission's decisions. The ATEEA has become a
weapon of the steel industry against the dumping of steel imports.
This is evidenced by: (1) the changes in the statutory language; (2)
numbers to productivity and arguing that the cause of the decline was due to technology that
required fewer employees to maintain the same production levels).
8 Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362; see also
Lawrence A. Schneider et al., AD/CVD and Customs Amendments Included in Recent US
Trade Legislation, ARNOLD & PORTER ADVISORY (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.apks.com/en/
perspectives/publications/2016/2/adcvd-and-customs-amendments-in-recent-us-trade.
9 Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27 §§ 501-507, 129 Stat. 362,
386-87.
10 Id.

11 See Press Release, Mike Bost, Congressman, Rep. Bost Introduces Bipartisan Bill to
Address Illegal Foreign Trade Practices (May 21, 2015), https://bost.house.gov/media-center/p
ress-releases/rep-bost-introduces-bipartisan-bill-address-illegal-foreign-trade [hereinafter
Bost] (discussing Rep. Bost's motivation for proposing the ATEEA after the temporary closure
of a steel plant employing 2,100 constituents in his congressional district).
12

Id.
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the steel industry's concern over the material injury standard
implemented by the courts; (3) the rhetoric of public officials in
President Obama's Administration and Congress; and (4) the
Commission's invocation of ATEEA changes in its decisions.
As to the second question, it is unlikely that a World Trade
Organization (WTO) panel would find these changes to be in
violation of the GATT. The GATT, the Antidumping Agreement,
and prior panel decisions indicate that the ATEEA amendments to
the material injury standard will not likely run afoul of the WTO
agreements.
II. DUMPING DEFINED AND U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW
In its technical form, "dumping" is defined as selling a product
in a foreign market for an artificially-low price as compared to the
exporter's home-market price. 13 For example, if an Italian pasta
company began selling macaroni in the U.S. for two dollars per box
when it sells the same box in Italy for three dollars, then the
company is dumping macaroni in the U.S. These artificially-low
prices can be the result of various conditions-protectionism,
14 Beyond
monopolies, subsidies-of the exporter's home market.
this technical definition there exists another connotation.
Dumping is viewed as "unfair" trade because domestic producers
may be harmed by the artificially-low prices of the competing
imports. 15 To offset any resulting harm, the U.S., and many other
16
countries, implement antidumping laws.
In the U.S., domestic industries are offered relief from foreigndumped products by the imposition of "antidumping duties" that

13

See RAJ

BHALA,

INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

LAW:

INTERDISCIPLINARY

THEORY AND

PRACTICE 871 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that dumping is calculated by subtracting the price
of the good in the exporter's home market from the price at which it is sold in the importing
market where a positive value indicates dumping has occurred and a zero or negative value
indicates dumping has not occurred).
14 See Brink Lindsey, The US Antidumping Law: Rhetoric Versus Reality, 34 J. WORLD
TRADEFeb. 2000, at 2 (explaining that dumping involves "allegedly... 'unfair' pricing
practices ... that reflect protectionism, cartelization, subsidies, and other structural defects
in foreign markets").
15 BHALA, supra note 13, at 880 (quoting JUDITH CZAKO, JOHANN HUMAN & JORGE
MIRANDA, A HANDBOOK ON ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATIONS 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003)).
16 See Lindsey, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining that U.S. antidumping law, for example,
offsets "market distortions caused by foreign governments").
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are levied on the offending dumped product. 17 This is done in
accordance with the antidumping laws codified in the Tariff Act of
1930.18 The relief process begins when a petition is filed by, or on
behalf of, a U.S. industry with the U.S. Department of
Commerce. 19 The Department of Commerce first determines if a
foreign producer has, in fact, dumped products in the U.S.
market. 20 If so, then the International Trade Commission has the
task of determining if the domestic industry has in fact been
"materially injured ... by reason of' the dumped imports. 2 1 Both
the Department of Commerce and the Commission issue
preliminary decisions. 22 If the Commission issues an affirmative
preliminary decision, or finds that the industry bringing the
petition has been materially injured, then both agencies continue
to investigate and make final determinations. 23 If both agencies
find material injury, then an "affirmative decision" is issued and
24
antidumping duties can be imposed.
To find material injury, the statute requires that the
Commission "consider: (1) the volume of imports of the subject
merchandise, (2) the effect of [the] imports.., on prices in the
17 See Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, Etc., WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.orglenglish/thewto_e/whatise/tif e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
(noting that the U.S. may charge extra duties on subsidized imports that are hurting domestic
producers).
18 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2012) (originally enacted as a part of the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497,
46 Stat. 590); see also U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 2015: OPERATION OF
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 65 (2016), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub
4627.pdf (describing the petition process for antidumping duty investigations).
19 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (2015). The Department of Commerce may also initiate an
antidumping investigation when it determines that one is warranted. Id. § 1673a(a)(1).
20 Id. § 1673(1).
21 Id. § 1673(2); see also id. § 1673b(a)(1).
When no material injury is found, the
Commission also determines if there was a threat of material injury. In the instance of
nascent industries, the Commission determines if the establishment of such industries is
being materially retarded.
The scope of this Note focuses on the material injury
determinations made by the Commission. See also Andrea C. Casson & Karl S. Von Schriltz,
A Review of the Court of International Trade's 2014 Decisions Addressing Trade Remedy
Determinations of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 27, 30-31
(2015) (discussing six U.S. Court of International Trade decisions in 2014 and the
Commission's process of reaching material injury determinations).
22

U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. NO. 4540, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DuTY

HANDBOOK, at 11-3 (14th ed. 2015), https://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/documents/handbo
ok.pdf [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
23 Id.
24 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(b)(1) (2012).
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United States for domestic like products, and (3) the impact of
[the] imports ... on domestic producers of domestic like
products ....-25 It defines material injury as "harm which is not
Ultimately,
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant."26
determinations made by the Commission can be appealed by an
interested party, or by a party who appeared in the original
27
investigation, to the Court of International Trade (CIT).
Decisions by the CIT can also be appealed to the Federal Circuit
28
Court of Appeals.

III. ANTIDUMPING LAW BEFORE THE AMERICAN TRADE
ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS ACT
A. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Before the ATEEA was amended in 2015, there were three
factors that the Commission considered when determining if a
domestic industry was harmed by reason of subject imports:
volume of imports, effect on domestic prices, and effect on the
domestic industry. The statute directed the Commission on what
Additionally, it directed the
to consider for each factor. 29
economic factors" affecting the
relevant
"all
Commission to analyze
0
state of the U.S. industry3 -- considered "within the context of the
business cycle." The first category of sub-factors included the
"actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share,
profits, productivity, return on investments, return on assets, and
utilization of capacity." 31 The second category considered the
dumped import's effect on "domestic prices." 32 The third category
25 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i)(I)-(III) (2015). The scope of this Note is the last of these three
considerations-the impact of subject imports on the domestic industry. The ATEEA
amended language pertaining to the finding of material injury in connection with this third
factor.
26 Id. § 1677(7)(A).
27 Casson & Von Schriltz, supra note 21, at 32.
28

Id.

See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)-(iii) (2012), amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)-(iii) (2015)
(stating, for example, that when "evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, the
Commission shall consider whether the volume... or any increase in that volume, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the United States, is significant').
30 Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii).
31 Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(I).
32 Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(I1).
29
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analyzed the "actual and potential negative effects on cash flow,
inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital,
and investment. '33 Lastly, the fourth category considered the
34
industry's ability to invest in research and development.
As decisions by the Commission are reviewable by the CIT, and
subsequently the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, "materially
injured... by reason of [less-than-fair-value] imports" has been
interpreted to require "both (1) present material injury and (2) a
finding that the material injury is 'by reason of the subject
imports. ' 35 In Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
the argument that a "merely
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
temporal[ ] connection between [dumped imports] and the material
injury" was sufficient to meet the "by reason of' requirement of the
statute. 36 To adequately show causation, the dumped imports
must account for more than a minimal or tangential contribution
This
to the harm experienced by the domestic industry. 37
interpretation resulted in the expansion of the scope of the
Commission's causal analysis and required a petitioner to
demonstrate substantial evidence of harm "by reason of' the
38
subject imports.
B. THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS

After every investigation that results in an affirmative decision,
the Commission issues a report detailing its findings and
analysis. 39 From January 2014 to June 29, 2015, when the
ATEEA was signed, the Commission reached final determinations
33 Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(III).
34 Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(IV) (directing the Commission to consider the "effects on the existing
development and production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a
derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like product).
3 Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 719-20 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis
added) (quoting Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1097, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
N Id. at 720.
37 See id. at 722 (holding the Commission's failure to consider the impact of a large
volume of non-subject imports in its material injury analysis did not meet the statute's
causation requirement).
38 See id. (holding the CIT erred when it found that any contribution by a subject import
to the material harm of the domestic industry was sufficient to satisfy the "by reason of'
requirement).
39 See HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 11-25 (discussing the publication process of the
Commission's reports).
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on sixteen antidumping investigations. 40 Slightly more than half
of these determinations found that the domestic industry suffered
material injury by reason of less-than-fair-value imports. 41 These
cases fall into three categories. The first category involved cases
where the domestic producers experienced a decline on all of the
statute's sub-factors. 42 The second category involved cases where
the domestic producers suffered significant financial decline but no
change in its operations and employment indicators. 43 The third
category involved cases where domestic producers saw a
significant decline in market share despite stable domestic
44
demand for their product.

40 See infra APPENDIX 1.
41 Id. The Commission issued affirmative decisions in nine of the sixteen, or 56.3% of its

decisions, and negative decisions in seven of the sixteen, or 43.7% of its decisions.
42 See, e.g., Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-512,
731-TA-1248, USITC Pub. 4509, 19 (Jan. 2015) (Final) (finding that the domestic industry
was materially injured as "[o]ver the period of investigation, virtually all trade and financial
indicators for the domestic industry declined, in spite of increases in apparent U.S.
consumption"); Non-Oriented Elec. Steel from China, Ger., Japan, Kor., Swed. and Taiwan,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-506, 508, 731-TA-1238-1243, USITC Pub. 4502, 30 (Nov. 2014) (Final)
(finding the domestic industry was materially injured because %irtually all indicators of the
domestic, industry's performance declined" in the period of investigation); Prestressed
Concrete Steel Rail Tie Wire from China and Mex., Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1207-1208, USITC
Pub. 4473, 21-22 (June 2014) (Final) (finding the domestic industry was materially injured
as the subject imports took market share away from the domestic industry whose output,
capacity utilization, market share, employment and profits declined); Diffusion-Annealed,
Nickel-Plated Flat-Rolled Steel Prod. from Japan, Inv. No. 731-TA-1206, USITC Pub. 4466,
20 (May 2014) (Final) (finding the domestic industry was materially injured as "the subject
imports took market share away from the domestic industry during a period when apparent
consumption was declining, causing the domestic industry's output and shipments to
decline... [resulting in] a negative impact on the industry's employment and financial
performance").
43 See, e.g., Welded Stainless Steel Pressure Pipe from Malay., Thai. and Viet., Inv. Nos.
731-TA-1210-1212, USITC Pub. 4477, 21 (July 2014) (Final) (finding that the domestic
industry was materially injured as "[a]lthough the domestic industry showed some
improvement in production, shipments, and market share ...it displayed poor and
worsening financial performance").
44 See Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Prods. from China and Taiwan, Inv. Nos.
701-TA-511, 731-TA-1246-1247, USITC Pub. 4519, 44 (Feb. 2015) (Final) (finding that the
domestic industry was materially injured by "the significant volume of subject imports from
China and Taiwan" causing the domestic like product to be undersold by "significant
margins"); Calcium Hypochlorite from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-510, 731-TA-1245, USITC
Pub. 4515, 21 (Jan. 2015) (Final) (finding that the domestic industry was materially injured
due to "significant volumes of subject imports pervasively" underselling "the domestic like
product, resulting in price depression and a decline in the domestic industry's sales
quantities ...

despite stable demand").
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The Commission's decisions that found no material injury also
fall into three categories. 45 The first category consists of cases
where the domestic producers have seen a basic improvement on
most of the statutory sub-factors. 46 In the second category, despite
experiencing decreased revenue, the domestic producers saw
improvement or stability in output, sales, and market share. 47 In
the third category, despite downward trends in many of the
statutory sub-factors, the domestic producer's market share grew
48
or remained stable.
C. TWO CASES LITIGATED ON THE BRINK OF THE AMERICAN TRADE
ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS ACT'S PASSAGE

The appellants in both Swiff-Train Co. v. United States and
JMC Steel Group v. United States challenged the Commission's
findings of material injury against them. 49 They were litigated
concurrently with the ATEEA's passage.50 These cases raised
issues that had important implications for the material injury
standard.
45 See infra APPENDIX 1.
46 See, e.g., Ferrosilicon from Venez., Inv. No. 731-TA-1225, USITC Pub. 4490, 19 (Sept.
2014) (Final) (finding no material injury to the domestic industry as "[m]any of the domestic
industry's trade and employment indicators improved from 2011 to 2013, and in most cases
the improvements outpaced the percent growth in apparent U.S. consumption"); Certain
Steel Threaded Rod from Thai., Inv. No. 731-TA-1214, USITC Pub. 4462, 24 (May 2014)
(Final) (finding no material injury to the domestic industry as "[m]any of the domestic
industry's trade and employment indicators improved-or essentially were stable during the
[period of investigation]"); Silica Bricks and Shapes from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1205,
USITC Pub. 4443, 20 (Jan. 2014) (Final) (finding no material injury to the domestic
industry as "[m]any of the domestic industry's trade and employment indicators
improved... despite the increase in subject import volume').
47 See, e.g., 1,1,1,2-Tetrafluoroethane from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-509, 731-TA-1244
USITC Pub. 4503, 21 (Dec. 2014) (Final) (finding no material injury to the domestic
industry as "apparent consumption was largely stable from 2011 to 2013, [and] the domestic
industry's output, shipments, market share, and employment indicators were also relatively
stable, showing only minor fluctuations").
48 See, e.g., Grain-Oriented Elec. Steel from Ger., Japan, and Pol., Inv. No. 731-TA-1233,
1234, 1236, USITC Pub. 4491, 28 (Sept. 2014) (Final) (finding that the domestic industry
was not materially injured despite the deterioration of "most of the industry's trade,
employment, and financial indicators" as the subject imports "did not take [a] significant
market share").
49 Swiff-Train Co. v. United States (Swiff-Train fl), 793 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
aff'g 999 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2014); JMC Steel Grp. v. United States, 70 F.
Supp. 3d 1309, 1311 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2015).
60 Swiff-Train II, 793 F.3d at 1355; JMC Steel Grp., 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1309.
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In Swiff-Train I and Swiff-Train II, the Coalition for American
Hardwood Parity filed a petition with the Department of Commerce
and the Commission alleging dumping by U.S. importers of Chinese
multi-layered wood flooring (MLWF) products.5 1 The Commission
found Chinese MLWF imports materially injured domestic
producers. 52 It cited downward trends in the industry's market
share, domestic shipments, net sales, production capacity,
inventory, and employment. 53 The Commission also cited the
54
industry's operating losses from 2008 to 2011.
As the period of investigation spanned the recession caused by
the housing and financial crisis of 2008, the importers of Chinese
MLWF contended that the recession was the cause of the domestic
industry's decline. 55 The Commission assessed the effects of the
recession as follows:
Although the general economic downturn and
declining demand for MLWF contributed to the
domestic industry's deteriorating performance from
2008 to 2009... we find that the decline in demand
associated with the downturn worked hand in hand
with the subject imports in contributing to the domestic
industry's deteriorating performance. We note that
the domestic industry's performance was poor
throughout the period under examination, including
prior to the fall in demand, as subject imports held a
very substantial share of the U.S. market from the
56
beginning.
In addition to blaming the recession, the MLWF importers argued
that improvement in the domestic industry's position towards the
61 Swiff-Train Co. v. United States (Swiff-Train 1), 999 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1357 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2014).
52

Id.

See Multilayered Wood Flooring from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-476, 731-TA-1179,
USITC Pub. 4278, 32-33 (Nov. 2011) (Final) [hereinafter Multilayered Wood Flooring]
(finding that the imports from Chinese firms under investigation "had a significant adverse
impact on the domestic industry ....[as a]lmost all of the domestic industry's performance
indicators declined significantly from 2008 to 2009").
5 Id.
66 Id. at 31.
5 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
53
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end of the investigation period "sever[ed] the causal connection,"
and thus, the domestic industry was not materially injured by
MLWF imports.5 7 They cited the increase in the industry's
production and net sales and decrease in the industry's financial
loss; however, the Commission was not convinced by these
improvements. 58 The Commission explained the industry: (1)
lagged behind the rest of the U.S. economy, (2) increased its
production to supply the foreign as opposed to the domestic
market, (3) experienced low employment numbers, (4) continued to
59
lose market share, and (5) showed declining finances.
After the Commission decided against them, MLWF importers
appealed to the CIT. 60 The CIT remanded the decision to the
Commission for further consideration of the impact the subject
imports had on the domestic industry in light of the housing
market's collapse. 61 The MLWF importers asserted that the
Commission was guilty of "cherry picking" data demonstrated by
the 3.4% improvement in the U.S. industry's operating margin
from 2008 to 2009 and its 2.1% improvement from 2010 to 2011.62
The Commission addressed the improvement of the U.S. industry's
operating margin on remand and still found that the dumped
imports had materially injured the domestic producers. 63 The
MLWF importer's again appealed to the CIT who, this time,
64
upheld the Commission's finding of material injury.
Still dissatisfied, the MLWF importers appealed to the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals.6 5 They argued that the Commission "did
not comply with the court's remand order in Swif/-Train I to apply
Specifically, the MLWF
a 'but-for' causation standard." 66
importer's proposed that the language of the statute required a
two-step analysis to decide: (1) if the subject-imports were a "butfor" cause of the industry's material injury, and then (2) if they

51 Id. at 32.
58 Id. at 34.
59 Id. at 36.
60 Swiff-Train I, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2014).
61

Id.

62

Id. at 1347.

63 Id. at 1346.
64

Swiff-Train II, 793 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

65

Id.

66

Id.
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were also a substantial factor of the industry's material injury. 67
The Court rejected this two-step analysis with its reliance on a
"but-for" test. 68 It reiterated that the Commission is "required to
'examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
This decision in Swiff-Train II
explanation for its action.' "69
further expanded the causation analysis required of the
Commission in making material injury determinations in dumping
petitions.
Swiff-Train II was being decided concurrently with the passage
of the ATEEA.70 The MLWF importer's argument that no material
injury existed because of the industry's recent profitability was at
issue.7 1 Lawmakers wanted to ensure that the MLWF importer's
argument was not a future hindrance on the Commission's finding
of material injury.
The second case, JMC Steel Group v. United States, was decided
on May 29, 2015, a month before the ATEEA was signed and only
eight days after it was introduced in the House of
Representatives. 72 In JMC Steel Group, domestic steel tube
manufacturers petitioned the Commission for relief from the
dumping of circular welded carbon-quality steel pipe (CWP) from
India, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam.7 3 The
Commission found that the domestic industry's material injury
The steel industry
was not caused by dumped imports.7 4
the
CIT,
which remanded
decision
to
representatives appealed this
the decision to the Commission to "explain how it ha[d] evaluated
the impact of subject imports on the domestic industry within the
75
context of the business cycle."
In its initial determination, the Commission "found 'no
evidence' that subject imports significantly depressed or
67

Id.

68

Id. at 1366.

at 1365.

69 Id. at 1362 (emphasis added) (citing Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 542
F.3d 867, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
70 See id. at 1355 (upholding the Commission's material injury determination on July 13,
2015, a few weeks after the ATEEA's enactment on June 25, 2015).
71 Id.
at 1366-67.
72 JMC Steel Grp. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1309 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2015);
American Trade Enforcement Effectiveness Act, H.R. 2523, 111th Cong. (2015).
73 JMC Steel Grp., 70 F. Supp. 3d 1311.
74 Id. at 1312.
76 Id.
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suppressed" the domestic like product.7 6 The Commission also
found that the domestic industry's performance improved in
"almost every measure ... despite the weak recovery in CWP
demand" after the economic crisis of 2008.77 The question the CIT
directed the Commission to answer was if the broader economic
recovery and the general improvement in the industry's
performance was masking material injury caused by the subject
imports. 78 The Court's main concern, as in Swiff-Train I and II,
was that the Commission missed a causal relationship by not
considering the context of the business cycle.7 9 On remand, the
Commission maintained that the domestic industry had not
suffered material injury for three reasons: (1) the "economic
recovery did not obscure injury to the domestic industry"; (2) there
was no "significant decline in the domestic industry's performance,
irrespective of trends in subject import volume, market share, and
underselling"; and (3) the causal relationship between subject
imports and domestic industry performance could have been
diluted by "the significant presence of competitively-priced nonsubject imports."80
The Commission also found that, despite an increase in lessthan-fair-value imports, the domestic industry's performance
improved and showed a steady increase in operating income.8 1
The Court concluded that while the domestic industry petitioners
criticized the Commission's business cycle analysis, they did not
82
adequately challenge the Commission's methodology or evidence.
The significance of JMC Steel on the ATEEA is that the
Commission made a negative determination regarding material

76 Id.
"Like product" is a term of art used in trade law to describe a product that has
been found to be 'like" the subject imports. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) (listing factors such as
the product's end-use, properties, nature, quality, and the consumers' tastes and habits
used in determining "like products').
77 JMC Steel Grp., 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1312.
78 Id. at 1313.
79 Id.

Id. at 1314 (citations omitted).
See id. at 1319 (noting the one exception to the domestic industry's steady increase in
operating income occurred from 2011 to 2012, but also noting that subject imports had
actually lost market share with respect to non-subject imports during this same period).
82 Id. (stating that the domestic industry petitioners "simply do not like the result of the
Commission's analysis').
80
81
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injury based on a recent improvement in profitability, specifically
operating profit. Recent improvement in profitability is specifically
addressed by the ATEEA's changes to the material injury standard.
IV. ANTIDUMPING LAW AFTER THE AMERICAN TRADE

ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS ACT
A. CHANGES TO THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AFTER THE AMERICAN
TRADE ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS ACT: BECOMING A WEAPON OF
U.S. STEEL PRODUCERS

On June 25, 2015, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015,
of which the ATEEA is a part, was enacted.8 3 The changes to the
amended sections of the Tariff Act of 1930 have been described as
some of the biggest in over twenty years.8 4 This is due, in part, to
the change in the material injury standard required for
antidumping petitions.8 5 The changes add five sub-factors to those
already existing. These include: (1) operating profit, (2) gross
profit, (3) net profit, (4) ability to service debt, and (5) return on
assets.8 6 The amendments also add an entirely new and critical
clause.8 7 This clause states that even if an industry is profitable or
was recently experiencing improved performance, the Commission
88
may still find material injury.
These changes indicate that the ATEEA was passed with the
purpose of assisting U.S. producers, notably the U.S. steel
This is evidenced by: (1) the
industry's domestic producers.
decisions in Swiff-Train I and 11,89 and JMC Steel;90 (2) the

83 Trade Preferences Extension Act, H.R. 2523, 114th Cong. (2015).
84 Alexander V. Sverdlov, Change Is Coming: What to Expect from the Recent
Amendments to the Trade Remedy Laws, 47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 161, 162 (2015).

86Id.
- 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (2015) (stating in its entirety "actual and potential decline in
output, sales, market share, gross profits, operating profits, net profits, ability to service
debt, productivity, return on investments, return on assets, and utilization of capacity").
87 Id. § 1677(7)(J) (2015) (adding the new clause: "Effect of Profitability of Domestic
Industries: Section 771(7) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677(7))," which states that
"[t]he Commission may not determine that there is no material injury or threat of material
injury to an industry in the United States merely because that industry is profitable or
because the performance of that industry has recently improved").
8 Id.
89 See supra Part llI.C (discussing the issues raised in Swiff-Train I and II in which the
Commission found, and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld approximately two
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rhetoric
of public
officials
within
President
Obama's
Administration as well as the House and Senate; and (3) the
antidumping petitions and subsequent decisions of the
Commission since the ATEEA.
The issues raised in Swift-Train I, Swiff-Train II, and JMC
Steel regarding the material injury requirement of the Tariff Act of
1930 were arguably exactly what the steel industry was hoping to
avoid with the amendments
made by the ATEEA. 91
Representative Bost, the ATEEA's sponsor, stated upon the
ATEEA's enactment, "[w]hen it was announced that Granite City
Works would be temporarily idling nearly 2,100 local steel jobs, I
immediately went to work to find a solution."92 He continued:
"Illegal trade practices are putting American jobs at risk, and I am
pleased we've received support from both sides of the aisle to
combat these practices." 93
Similar sentiments have been
expressed
in official
documents
of President
Obama's
Administration. The Department of Commerce issued a statement
in 2016 discussing the threat that the global excess in steel poses
to the American steel industry and what policy actions could be
taken in response. 94
Changing trade laws, including the
enactment of the ATEEA, "which overturns past judicial
interpretations that limited Commerce's ability to enforce our

weeks after the passage of ATEEA, material injury despite the domestic producers' recent
increase in net sales).
90 See supra Part II.C (discussing JMC Steel in which the CIT, eight days before the
ATEEA's introduction in Congress, upheld the Commission's finding that the U.S. domestic
steel industry was not materially injured because its conditions has recently improved).
91 See Neil R. Ellis et al., Amendments to U.S. Trade Remedy Laws Aim to Strengthen the
Position of U.S. Industries and Reduce Commerce Department Workload, SIDLEY (July 8,
2015), http://www.sidley.com/news/2015-07-08_internationaltrade-update ('The prohibition
is clearly aimed at a concern... that the Commission may be unwilling to find material injury
if there is evidence that an industry has recently become profitable... [such as] the U.S. steel
industry [who] filed petitions in early June seeking relief... although the industry's
profitability improved in 2014, as compared to 2013, and is currently profitable, it [alleges that
it] nonetheless is suffering material injury.').
92 Bost, supra note 11.
93 Id.
9 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Addressing Steel Excess
Capacity and Its Impacts: Ensuring a Level Playing Field for American Business and
Workers (Apr. 13, 2016), http://trade.gov/press/press-releases/2016/steel-overcapacity-facts
heet-041316.pdf (stating that "[t]he Obama Administration is looking at all angles to
address [the challenge of global excess in steel]").
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AD/CVD laws," was one such action taken by the Administration. 95
The deliberate increase in Commerce-initiated antidumping and
96
countervailing duty investigations was another.
This same sentiment was shared by members of the Senate as
evidenced by a letter sent by the Senate Finance Committee to the
U.S. Secretary of Commerce in April of 2016.97 The letter asked the
Secretary to "address global overcapacity in steel and to enforce
U.S. trade laws, including... the recently enacted.. . American
Trade Enforcement Effectiveness Act."98 The use of trade remedy
laws, such as the amended ATEEA, were widely recognized by
public officials as a weapon that could be used to offset some effects
of dumped steel imports on domestic steel producers. 99
B. THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS UNDER
THE AMERICAN TRADE ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS ACT

In addition to the amendments introduced by the ATEEA
addressing the material injury standard, and the stated purpose of
these amendments by public officials, analysis of the Commission's
decisions since the ATEEA's enactment indicates that these
changes have affected the Commission's findings of material
injury. 1°° Looking at final antidumping determinations decided by
the Commission from the time of the law's enactment on June 25,
2015 until January 2017, one notes that findings of material injury
have increased. 10 1 The Commission found material injury in
approximately fifty percent of petitions brought by the steel

95 Id.
9 See id. ("U.S. [Antidumping/Countervailing Duty] law is a vital tool to address unfair
trade practices, including in the steel sector .... In [2015] alone, Commerce initiated 62
investigations ....Of these, almost two-thirds relate to steel and of the 61 ongoing trade
remedy investigations, 75 percent involve steel products.").
97 Letter from U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin. to Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative,
and Penny Pritzker, Secretary of Commerce (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.finance.senate.
gov/chairmans-news/senate- fnance-committee-memberscall-for-effective-trade-enforcemen
t-to-combat-market-distorting-pohcies.
98 Id.

99 See Bost, supra note 11 (explaining that the ATEEA "will ensure foreign competitors
who engage in illegal trade practices are held accountable to further prevent [an] unfair
advantage").
100 See infra APPENDICES 1-2.
101 Id. Findings of material injury in the Commission's determinations before the ATEEA

were 56.3% compared to 89.5% after.
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industry before the ATEEA's enactment as compared to eighty10 2
four percent of petitions brought after the ATEEA's enactment.
Cases in which the Commission found material injury fall into the
three categories mentioned above, 10 3 or into a new category in
which the Commission invoked the "effect on profitability" clause
added in § 1677(7)(J).104
In these cases, the Commission found material injury despite
increasing profitability in three instances. The first occurred when
the industry experienced declines in domestic shipments, net
sales, production, employment rate, and the closing of
manufacturing facilities.1 0 5
The second occurred when the
industry experienced reduced sales volumes; and decreased
commercial
shipments,
employment,
production,
capacity
1
0
6
utilization, and inventories.
The third occurred when the
industry experienced intermittent increases in profitability and
revenue despite a ten percent increase in U.S. consumption.1 0 7 As
these cases demonstrate, the ATEEA has made it significantly
easier for domestic producers to successfully use antidumping
petitions to affect the importation of dumped products.
C. SIGNIFICANCE INTERNATIONALLY: THE WTO AND THE FUTURE OF
THE AMERICAN TRADE EFFECTIVENESS ENFORCEMENT ACT

Changes in trade remedy laws are likely to be accompanied by
disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, an
important question emerges: what will a WTO panel likely
Id.
See supra Part III.B.
104 See Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products from China and Japan, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-541, 731TA-1284, 1286, USITC Pub. 4619, n.86 (July 2016) (Final) [hereinafter Flat Products]
(noting "the existence of a profitable industry, or one whose performance has improved, does
not foreclose an affirmative material injury determination").
105 See Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA522, 731-TA-1258, USITC Pub. 4545, 37-38 (Aug. 2015) (finding the domestic industry was
materially injured despite its increasing profitability during the period of investigation, as
it still suffered from declines in raw material costs, U.S. shipments, net sales, production,
and employment).
106 See Flat Products, USITC Pub. 4619 (finding the domestic industry was materially
injured as the domestic industry's "performance was impaired").
107 See Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Flat Products from Aust., Braz., Japan, Kor., Neth., Turk.
and the U.K., Inv. Nos. 701-TA-545-547, 731-TA-1291-1297, USITC Pub. 4638, 40 (Sept. 2016)
(Final) (concluding "in many respects the domestic industry did not perform as well as would
have been expected during the 2013-2014 time of growing demand due to subject imports").
102
103
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conclude if a member state brings a dispute against the U.S. based
The GATT, the
on the changes made by the ATEEA?
Antidumping Agreement, and prior WTO panel and Appellate
Body dispute reports indicate that the ATEEA's changes to the
material injury standard will not likely run afoul of the WTO
agreements.
Concern over dumping has existed in the international
Despite its
community since the signing of the GATT.1 08
states to
allows
GATT
the
overarching goal of eliminating tariffs,
impose antidumping duties to offset harm caused by dumping. 10 9
To guide the implementation of antidumping duties by the GATT's
member states, the Antidumping Agreement lists "relevant
economic factors" that the imposing state must include in making
its injury determination.11 0 These include factors such as "actual
and potential decline[s] in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity." '
Other factors include: " [effects on] domestic prices; the magnitude
of the margin of dumping; [and] actual and potential negative
effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth,
11 2
ability to raise capital or investments.
The European Union (EU) asked a WTO panel to determine if
China's investigating authority properly imposed antidumping
duties, in accordance with factors listed in the Antidumping
Agreement, against a company based in the EU.11 3 The EU argued
that China's investigating authority "incorrectly characterised
certain factors as 'negative' by ignoring positive trends exhibited
by each of the factors at issue."114 The panel reviewed its prior
decisions and noted that flexibility is afforded to WTO member
states in determining the impact of dumping on their domestic
108 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1,700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, [hereinafter GATT].
109 See GATT, supra note 108, art. VI:2 ('In order to offset or prevent dumping, a
contracting party may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in
amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product.").
110Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1995 art. 3.4, 1868 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement].
111 Id.
112

Id.

Panel Report, China - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection
Equipment from the European Union, WTO Doc. WT/DS425/R (adopted Feb. 26, 2013).
114 Id. at 59.
113
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industries. 115 As a result of this flexibility, the panel found
"positive
trends
in
a
number
of factors"
do
not
"preclude... investigating authorities from making an affirmative
determination of injury."116 The panel concluded that a "thorough
and persuasive explanation as to whether and how such positive
movements were outweighed by any other [negative] factors"
would be required in such circumstances. 117
Emphasizing
"explanation," the panel noted a fellow panel's decision.1 18 There,
"only [three] factors developed negatively over the [period
of
investigation]."'19 The investigating authority explained, however,
that the growth was below what was needed to stay competitive.1 20
The panel agreed, finding the industry was materially injured. 12 1
The language of the GATT, the Antidumping Agreement, and
the panel decision in the EU-China dispute, indicate that changes
to the ATEEA do not clearly violate these WTO agreements for
several reasons. First, the language pertaining to material injury
of the ATEEA and the Antidumping Agreement is identical with
regard to many factors.1 22 This consistency in the language of the
statute and the Antidumping Agreement makes a WTO panel less
likely to disagree with the Commission's analysis of material
injury. Second, the general tone of Article VI:1 of the GATT is to
condemn dumping when it causes material injury. It allows states
to take measures to stop or prevent this injury. 123 Finally, the
issue decided by the panel in the EU-China dispute is similar to
that decided by the CIT and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in
115

Id.

116 Id.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Panel Report, EC-Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Chips from Korea, WTO Doc. WT/0S299/2 (adopted Nov. 21, 2003)).
117
118

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1677(c)(iii) (2015) (defining relevant factors in determining
material injury as "actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, gross profits,
operating profits, net profits, ability to service debt, productivity, return on investments,
return on assets, and utilization of capacity"), with GATT, supra note 108, art. VI:A
(determining material
injury "shall include an evaluation
of all relevant
factors... including actual or potential decline in sales, profit, output, market share,
productivity, return on investment, or utilization of capacity").
122 See GATT, supra note 108, art. VI:A ("[D]umping... is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry.').
122
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Swiff-Train I and II, and JMC Steel. In the EU-China dispute,
the EU claimed that the Chinese domestic producers had
experienced positive trends in a number of factors. The WTO
panel, however, found that such positive trends do not
124
This is
automatically preclude findings of material injury.
similar to the "effect of profitability" language added to the
ATEEA as a result of Swif/-Train I and H and JMC Steel. Lastly,
the panel's reasoning in the EU-China dispute is similar to that
engaged in by the CIT and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in
Swiff-Train I and H as well as JMC Steel. The panel and these
courts were both concerned with articulating a satisfactory causal
explanation supported by substantial evidence.
V. CONCLUSION

In the current U.S. political environment, free trade has become
a polarized topic. Much of the American public is concerned about
job loss that many perceive to be caused by free-trade. As a result,
pressure has risen, especially from the U.S. steel industry, to
protect U.S. industries from dumped goods. Trade remedy laws,
especially antidumping measures, are popular countermeasures
against "unfair trade" practices.
With bipartisan support, the American Trade Enforcement
Effectiveness Act was passed and signed into law by President
Obama on June 25, 2015. It amended the Tariff Act of 1930.
Specifically, with regard to antidumping, it altered the standard
required to find material injury by adding economic factors to be
considered by the Commission in antidumping petitions. More
importantly, it added an entirely new consideration to Section
This new consideration forbids the Commission from
1677.
refusing to find material injury merely because an industry has
been recently profitable.
Two questions raised by the passage of the ATEEA in this Note
were: (1) has the ATEEA affected the Commission's final decisions
in antidumping petitions, particularly those involving the steel
industry, and (2) will the changes made by the ATEEA be found to
violate the GATT and the Antidumping Agreement? The answer

124

See supra Part I.c.
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to the first question is clearly yes. The Commission has issued a
significantly higher number of affirmative material injury findings
in dumping investigations since the enactment of the ATEEA than
before. In answering the first question, however, the analysis
reveals that the ATEEA has been frequently used as a weapon of
the U.S. steel industry against dumped steel. This is evidenced by:
(1) the changes in the statutory language itself; (2) the steel
industry's concern over the causation requirement at issue in
Swiff-Train I, Swiff-Train II and JMC Steel; (3) the rhetoric of
public officials from the White House to Congress; and (4) the
invocation of the new clause, Section 1677(7)(J), by the
Commission in its antidumping decisions.
Despite the significant effect of this change on the
Commission's decisions, it is unlikely that these changes violate
the GATT or the Antidumping Agreement for four reasons. The
first reason is the stance taken against dumping in the GATT
Article IV:.
The second reason is that the necessary factors
required to find material injury in the Antidumping Agreement
and the ATEEA are similar; thus, disagreement between a WTO
panel and the Commission is unlikely. The third reason is that
the panel in the EU-China dispute upheld the Chinese
investigative agency's finding of material injury despite the
domestic industry's recent positive trends as the Commission has
done since. Fourth and finally, the WTO panel established a
flexible approach focusing on the strength of the investigative
agency's explanation in prior disputes over antidumping duties.
This approach resembles the approach taken by the CIT and the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Swiff-Train I and II, and JMC
Steel. For these reasons a WTO panel would likely agree with a
decision of the Commission; therefore, the ATEEA is not likely to
run afoul of the WTO agreements.
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VI. APPENDIX 1: COMPILATION OF USITC ANTIDUMPING
INVESTIGATION FINAL DECISIONS FROM JANUARY 2014 TO
JUNE 2015125
Date of Final
Decision
Jan. 2014
May 2014
May 2014

June 2014

July 2014

Sept. 2014

Name
Silica Bricks and Shapes from
China
Certain Steel Threaded Rod
from Thai.
Diffusion-Annealed, NickelPlated Flat-Rolled Steel Prod.
from Japan
Prestressed Concrete Steel
Rail Tie Wire from China and
Mex.
Welded Stainless Steel
Pressure Pipe from Malay.,
Thai., and Viet.
Certain Oil Country Tubular
Goods from India, Kor., the
Phili., Taiwan, Thai., Turk.,

Determination
Silica Brick Industry NOT
Materially Injured
Steel Industry NOT
Materially Injured
Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Oil Pipeline Industry
Materially Injured

Ukr., and Viet.

Sept. 2014

Ferrosilicon from Venez.

Sept. 2014

Grain-Oriented Electrical
Steel from Ger., Japan, and
Pol.
Monosodium Glutamate from
China and Indon.
Non-Oriented Electrical Steel
from China, Ger., Japan, Kor.,
Swed., and Taiwan
Drill Pipe and Drill Collars
from China
1,1,1,2-Tetrafluoroethane from
China
Carbon and Certain Alloy
Steel Wire Rod from China
Calcium Hypochlorite from
China
Certain Crystalline Silicon
Photovoltaic Prods. from
China and Taiwan
Circular Welded CarbonQuality Steel Pipe from India,

Nov. 2014
Nov. 2014

Dec. 2014
Dec. 2014
Jan. 2015
Jan. 2015
Feb. 2015

Feb. 2015

Steel Industry NOT
Materially Injured
Steel Industry NOT
Materially Injured
Chemical Industry
Materially Injured
Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Steel Industry NOT
Materially Injured
Chemical Industry NOT
Materially Injured
Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Chemical Industry
Materially Injured
Solar Power Industry
Materially Injured
Steel Industry NOT
Materially Injured

Oman, the UAE, and Viet.

125 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, https://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/publications/opinions-in
dex.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2017) (listing the Commission's determinations and links to
final determination reports).
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Percentages for All
Determinations:
By Steel Industry:
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56.3% Find Material Injury

43.7% No Material Injury

50.0% Find Material Injury

50.0% No Material Injury
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VII. APPENDIX 2: COMPILATION OF USITC ANTIDUMPING
INVESTIGATION FINAL DECISIONS FROM JUNE

2015

TO

JANUARY 2017126
Date of Final
Decision
July 2015

Name

Determination

Certain Steel Nails from Kor.,

Steel Industry Materially

Malay., Oman, Taiwan, and Viet.

Injured

Aug. 2015

Certain Passenger Vehicles and
Light Truck Tires from China

Automobile Industry
Materially Injured

Oct. 2015

Boltless Steel Shelving Units
Prepackaged for Sale from China

Steel Industry Materially
Injured

Nov. 2015

Certain Welded Line Pipe from
Kor. and Turk.
Sugar from Mex.

Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Sugar Industry
Materially Injured
Paper Industry
Materially Injured
Paper Industry
Materially Injured

Nov. 2015
Dec. 2015
Feb. 2016

Apr. 2016

Apr. 2016

Supercalendered Paper from
Canada
Certain Uncoated Paper from
Austr., Braz., China, Indon. and
Port.
Polyethylene Terephthalate Resin
from Canada, China, India and
Oman
Silicomanganese from Austr.

Chemical Industry
Materially Injured
Steel Industry NOT
Materially Injured

July 2016

July 2016
Aug. 2016
Sept. 2016

Certain Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Products from China,
India, Italy, Kor., and Taiwan
Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products
from China and Japan
Hydrofluorocarbon Blends and
Components from China

Steel Industry Materially
Injured

Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Flat
Prods. From Austr., Braz.,
Japan, Kor., Neth., Turk., and

Steel Industry Materially
Injured

Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Chemical Industry
Materially Injured

the U.K.

Sept. 2016

Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Prods.
From Braz., India, Kor., Russ.,

Sept. 2016

Heavy Walled Rectangular
Welded
Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes
from

Steel Industry Materially
Injured

and the U.K

Kor.,
Oct. 2016

126

Steel Industry Materially
Injured

Mex., and Turk.

Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar
from Mex.

Steel Industry Materially
Injured

Id.
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Nov. 2016
Dec. 2016

Dec. 2016

Percentages for All
Determinations:
By Steel Industry:
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Welded Stainless Steel Pressure
Pipe from India
Circular Welded Carbon-Quality
Steel Pipe from Oman, Pak., the
UAE., and Viet.
Certain Iron Mechanical
Transfer Drive Components
from Can. and China
89.5% Find Material Injury

Steel Industry Materially
Injured
Steel Inlustry Materially
Injured

84.6% Find Material Injury

15.4% No Material Injury

Steel Industry NOT
Materially Injured
10.5% No Material Injury
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